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Abstract
There is a little information on how to design a social robot that effectively executes 
consciousness-emotion (C-E) interaction in a socially acceptable manner. In fact, devel-
opment of such socially sophisticated interactions depends on models of human high-
level cognition implemented in the robot’s design. Therefore, a fundamental research 
problem of social robotics in terms of effective C-E interaction processing is to define a 
computational architecture of the robotic system in which the cognitive-emotional inte-
gration occurs and determine cognitive mechanisms underlying consciousness along 
with its subjective aspect in detecting emotions. Our conceptual framework rests upon 
assumptions of a computational approach to consciousness, which points out that con-
sciousness and its subjective aspect are specific functions of the human brain that can 
be implemented into an artificial social robot’s construction. Such research framework 
of developing C-E addresses a field of machine consciousness that indicates important 
computational correlates of consciousness in such an artificial system and the possibility 
to objectively describe such mechanisms with quantitative parameters based on signal-
detection and threshold theories.
Keywords: social robot, consciousness-emotion interaction, machine consciousness, 
signal-detection theory
1. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that a social robot should be an embodied agent which can com-
municate with people easily, using both verbal and nonverbal signals [1]. Such a robot needs 
to have a wide range of social and cognitive skills [2, 3] to understand human behavior and 
to be intuitively understood by people. However, it should be noted that nowadays there is 
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a gap between the requirements concerning a social robot and their implementations. It is 
due to imperfection in technology and deficiencies in theory in various areas ranging from 
psychology through computer science up to classical robotics. Despite of intense technologi-
cal efforts over the last two decades in terms of developing high-level cognition models for 
human-robot interaction (HRI), so far, robot’s constructions have been hardly equipped with 
such competency. Here, we focus on issues concerning development on processing the inter-
action between consciousness and emotions in a social robot.
2. Designing human-robot interaction
Designing efficient HRI is a basic research problem of modern social robotics [1, 4]. This is 
mainly due to a technological struggle to make a construction of robots that is intended to 
share space with humans and support them in daily life in a socially acceptable manner. The 
joint efforts of modern research including cognitive psychology, developmental psychol-
ogy, philosophy of mind, and modern technology such as artificial intelligence and machine 
learning show that creating effective HRI depends on the implementation of human high-
level cognition into a robot’s system. For example, emotions in the context of social robots 
have attracted a considerable attention for the last two decades [5]. It is expected that artifi-
cial emotions increase plausibility of interactions including predictability of a robot behav-
ior. The well-known idea of a “theory of mind” describing our ability to mentalize others’ 
internal states was captured by theoretical accounts by Baron-Cohen [6] and Leslie [7] and 
finally was used to construct a Cog humanoid robot with the usage of current technology 
[3]. In addition, endowing of a robot in a theory of mind [3] could allow the robot to detect, 
recognize, interpret, and react to a human behavior and hence to make interaction more 
human-like. There are a lot of works concerning emotions, computational models of emo-
tions in psychology, and computer science, but there is no result to date that would consid-
erably improve a social robot behavior. Attempts to implement and verify a computational 
model of emotions in a control system of a real robot have been undertaken systematically 
for many years. For example, emotional system of Kismet designed from scratch is strongly 
inspired by various theories of emotions in humans [2]. An affective, computational model 
of mind fearnot affective mind architecture (FAtiMA) [8] was implemented in the robot 
FLASH [9]. The works in [10–12] are examples of systems that were verified using agent-
based modeling software and possess a potential in the context of implementation in robots. 
The experience gained to date points to three areas of challenges.
Nowadays, sensory systems of robots are insufficient to detect social events, such as human 
emotions, intentions, attention points, etc. Clear and natural expressing of emotions and 
other internal states by a robot requires advanced and expensive mechatronic solutions. 
Computational model of consciousness and emotions can be interpreted as compound com-
ponents of a higher level part of the robot control architecture. Therefore, implementation of 
such models requires them to be formally complete and adequate that is not guaranteed by 
the current psychological research.
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3. Consciousness-emotion interaction as functions of the human 
brain
Philosophy of designing robotic systems inspired by human high-level cognition, including 
attentional and perceptual processes, is commonly used and known as a biologically inspired 
approach (see [11–13]). Some studies have also indicated the possibility of implementing into 
the social robot a computational architecture, which is inspired by a neurobiological basis of 
the brain [14]. For instance, there are well-developed robotic control systems of high-level 
cognition that implement a feature-integration theory of attention [15] or a model of saliency-
based attentional search mechanisms [16] that have been intensively verified both behavior-
ally and computationally [13].
Contemporary brain research suggests that the interaction of cognition and emotion may be 
crucial for a social robot’s design [14, 17]. For instance, Pessoa [14] argues that the fundamental 
problem is to determine an organization of the robotic system in which cognition and emotion 
are intertwined in a general information-processing architecture. In general, such information-
processing architecture should be viewed as a general theory that describes important com-
ponents of the system and relations between such components [18]. In this way, the adopted 
architecture can determine an organization of the cognitive system and general principles of 
information processing in the robotic system. Therefore, goal-directed or conscious behavior of 
a social robot in terms of recognizing human affective states will require understanding how 
complex cognitive and affective processing should be mapped into a robotic information-pro-
cessing system that performs computational algorithms to integrate C-E interactions effectively 
as the human brain does it. In fact, brain research indicates that there is no decisive evidence 
what kind of organization of information processing is ultimate to mediate the C-E interaction 
effectively. Many neuroscientists (see [19, 20]) indicate that there is a functional division in the 
brain between low-level processes of emotion regulation (for instance, linked with amygdala 
activation) and higher order processes that are associated with frontal and parietal cortical activ-
ity involved in conscious goal-directed behavior. In addition, according to modern neurobio-
logical accounts (see [21]), the amygdala synchronizes and modulates access to affective stimuli 
in such a way that their representations are stronger (exert a stronger influence on behavior) 
than neutral stimuli. Thus, selection of specific architecture can determine how a specialized 
C-E interaction system should be organized; it should also enable to define specific components 
of such system that are attributed to specific brain structures as well as describe how computa-
tions underlie high-level cognitive processes underlying such interaction. Following this line 
of reasoning, it is possible that the architecture of the C-E interaction in the social robot may 
be either structured into blocks (a theoretical system that processes sequentially, in which the 
knowledge is hierarchical, etc.), or modules (there are independent, autonomous, distributed 
modules handled by a central processor, e.g. [22]) or represents some kind of non-modular 
organization in which information processing is inspired by neurocomputations for which sim-
ple interactions between processing units are going on [23]. It is therefore important in terms of 
social robots to set up theoretical criteria to analyze potential architecture of the C-E interaction 
in the brain regarding structural components and functionality of the social robot’s system.
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4. Consciousness-emotion interaction and machine consciousness 
approach: establishing formal assumptions
Besides specific architecture of cognition for social robots, the essential problem of designing 
effective HRI is to analyze conscious behavior of the robot by considering human conscious 
knowledge and therefore considering subjectivity experience that accompanies consciousness 
(phenomenal aspects of consciousness; see [24, 25]). In our opinion, such a research problem 
should be embedded within the area of machine consciousness that can identify critical com-
putational correlates of consciousness [26] to establish HRI. According to this computational 
approach, consciousness and its subjective experience can be explained by higher level cogni-
tion that is grounded in neurocomputations in the brain [25]. This approach not only allows 
for development of machine consciousness but also attempts to explain a so-called hard prob-
lem of consciousness that is related to inability to objectively measure phenomenal aspects of 
consciousness (see [27]). In fact, the theories of machine consciousness have been successively 
implemented in artificial environments (e.g., system CLARION; see [28]); some attempts were 
made in terms of implementing them into robotic systems [29].
Given such philosophical physicalism [30], we assume that consciousness of the robot can be 
addressed within an information-processing framework in terms of behavior control, informa-
tion integration, attention and access to the information, or ways of expressing internal states 
of the robot. According to this framework, social robots are embodied, socially intelligent 
agents, operating in the human environment [1, 11, 12]. Our conceptual framework attempts 
to solve the problem of modeling consciousness-emotion interactions using the machine con-
sciousness approach. Below, we will demonstrate that feasibility of hypothesized computa-
tional correlates of consciousness for the C-E interaction in a social robot system is formally 
allowed within on a signal-detection theory (SDT) [31] and a threshold theory [32, 33].
5. Modeling consciousness-emotion interaction using a combination 
of signal-detection and threshold approaches
According to Reggia and colleagues [25], the machine consciousness approach indicates that 
a possible computational correlate of consciousness is representational property defined as 
a possible way of encoding incoming information in the cognitive system. It is postulated in 
this account that such representations may be a pattern of neuronal activity that is encoded 
in the current states of the neuronal network [34]. For example, in a study on visual aware-
ness with backward masking [35], patterns of conscious behavior are described as human 
ability to detect emotion under a forced-choice condition within a series of signal (e.g., mimic 
fear expression) and noise trials (e.g., neutral face expression) (see [36]). The assumption that 
consciousness is the ability to differentiate signal from noise based on choice behavior has 
enabled researchers to use a signal-detection theory (SDT) to quantify consciousness of emo-
tion with objective sensitivity parameters [37]. It is therefore clear that conscious behavior 
identified with the SDT parameters can be used as a computational correlate to determine 
objective representations of the C-E interactions in the social robot’s construction.
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The computational approach to consciousness [25] also points out that an additional potential 
computational correlate of consciousness is represented by relational properties between the 
components of human knowledge. According to Reggia and colleagues [25], assumptions of 
higher order theory (HOT) of consciousness [36] nicely fit with this computational aspect. In 
particular, HOT postulates a computational correlate of consciousness which is the relation-
ship between stimulus representation and its corresponding subjective knowledge of being 
conscious of the first-order representation (metarepresentation) [25]. In fact, modeling stud-
ies of consciousness and emotion [33, 37] showed that an adequate computational approach 
which considers the relation between consciousness and emotion can be described within the 
SDT framework. Szczepanowski [33] with his original proposal has shown that the SDT com-
putational model may consider the fact that consciousness and emotions interact with one 
another. In addition, such computational SDT model of consciousness allows for a hierarchy 
of the information processing associated with conscious detection of emotion, that is, higher 
order processing requires prior discriminations of emotion at the lower level. This suggests 
that the relational relationship between the components of knowledge underlying architec-
ture of the C-E interaction could be crucial for a social robot’s design.
The machine consciousness framework also indicates that consciousness is characterized by 
a specific information-processing mode [25, 38]. Some theoretical accounts emphasize effec-
tiveness of such conscious processing, and it has been argued that the information content in 
conscious state is processed globally [38]. For instance, Dehaene [39] who is an advocate of 
such line of reasoning has shown that global processing in the brain may be linked with acti-
vation of extensive long-distance neuronal connections that link several separate brain areas, 
including prefrontal areas that are not activated in another processing mode [38]. Indeed, 
such conscious processing mode may stand for a computational correlate of consciousness 
that explains the nature of conscious access that involves subject’s disposition to action and 
mobilizes and integrates mental functions that operate independently and differ in terms of 
tasks under the unconscious condition [38]. In the context of conscious affective processing, it 
seems likely that activation of the global processing mode may operate on an “all-or-none” or 
discrete fashion when emotional stimuli enter consciousness [37, 40]. In fact, Szczepanowski 
[33] based on a Krantz threshold theory [32] demonstrated that preferences for affective rep-
resentation to access consciousness may be the threshold processing. Thus, preferential con-
scious processing of emotion in the brain may arise from the fact that activation strength of 
affective stimuli to enter consciousness is characterized in the discrete manner [33, 37, 40]. 
This implies that in the case of affective information, the robotic system could be implemented 
with the global processing mode based on thresholds to be able for handling effective and 
natural HRI.
Thus, with the abovementioned assumptions, our conceptual framework shows that the com-
putational organization underlying the C-E interaction in the robotic system should corre-
spond to an architecture of affective computing in the brain [14, 41] and should be based 
on computational correlates of consciousness [25] by including (i) a low-level representation 
correlate which enables robot’s objective conscious perception of emotion, (ii) a metacognitive 
correlate of robot’s subjective knowledge of emotion, and (iii) a conscious processing mode 
based on global access to the emotion content. Here, we will explain in detail the idea of mod-
eling computational correlates of C-E interactions with mathematical frameworks.
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6. Signal-detection theory to encode objective consciousness of 
emotion in a social robot
The SDT theory assumes that the ability of human subject to perceive a stimulus is 
described by the probability of deciding whether a signal or noise stimulus was presented 
in a given trial [31]. The fluctuations of a stimulus presented within series of trials, for 
example, manipulated with a time exposure, or visibility of the stimulus, are determined 
by Gaussian probability density functions [31, 33, 42]. Because of presentations of two 
stimulus types under the forced-choice detection condition, participant within experimen-
tal condition produces correct (a hit (H) and correct rejection (CR)) and incorrect responses 
(a false alarm (FA) and miss (M)). The ability to detect a stimulus is then described by a 
sensitivity parameter d’Type I, which conceptually corresponds to a difference in mean val-ues from the probability distributions for the signal and noise. In addition to the sensitiv-
ity measure, the detection theory also provides a bias measure cType 1, which determines the participant’s tendency to favor either “yes” or “no” responses during the detection 
process. Based on probability distributions, the receiver operating curve (ROC) is com-
puted whose course determines the participant’s ability to detect stimuli. According to 
the SDT, the task performance above the chance level will indicate conscious perception 
as measured by a significant nonzero sensitivity index (d’Type I > 0). Similar conclusions are formulated when a size of the area under the ROC curve is above the level of 0.5 which 
is characterized by the so-called parameter A’Type 1. In fact, according to Lau [42], the SDT sensitivity measure of consciousness in detection tasks is not sufficient and in terms of 
consciousness, it is important to determine decision criteria for detecting a stimulus based 
on the c parameter rather than discrimination ability per se. For instance, the SDT inter-
pretation of behavior in blindsight patient with visual cortex damage who deny any visual 
sensation in the resultant visual field defect but can nonetheless detect the visual emotion 
stimuli presented in the area [43] would indicate a nonzero value d’Type I and paradoxically conscious perception. Therefore, in terms of the consciousness measure, establishing and 
maintaining appropriate decision-making are critical when detecting stimuli, rather than 
using sensitivity values d’Type I which rather would refer to the basic effectiveness of the information processing [42].
In terms of machine consciousness, it seems to be clear that the SDT approach by estimating 
sensitivity of first-order detection of emotion and bias can allow to determine computational 
correlates of social robot’s objective knowledge about human affective states. A hypotheti-
cal robotic system (see Figure 1) with the functionality of objective consciousness of emo-
tion may be equipped with emotion recognition algorithms that constantly analyze human 
expressions based on sequences of affective stimuli within time events and will then result 
in online SDT computations that simulate objective consciousness about recognized human 
affective state. In such a way, the use of the detection theory will enable to capture one of 
the key properties of conscious knowledge associated with choice behavior [44] in a possible 
robotic system.
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7. Signal-detection approach to encode metacognitive consciousness 
of emotion in a social robot
Objective theories of consciousness link consciousness to the ability of detecting incoming 
external stimuli by choice [45]. According to this view, consciousness is described as sensory 
processing that ignores first-person experience underlying subjective knowledge (metacogni-
tion) of its own representation of processing the incoming information. The problem of con-
sciousness and its relations to metacognition has been viewed a central topic in consciousness 
research [46] which fits well the HOT approach [47]. This theory of consciousness is now con-
sidered to be a main framework that explains how people are aware of their conscious states 
[47]. On the one hand, HOT implies an assumption that consciousness depends on the pres-
ence of metacognition [48, 49]; on the other hand, there are opposite claims that metacognition 
is a prerequisite for the emergence of consciousness [50, 51]. According to this second assump-
tion, consciousness is a first-person metarepresentation which refers to the ability to acquire 
knowledge about first-order mental states [52]. This second HOT view is well documented by 
studies on conscious learning with a neuronal network approach in which the brain via learn-
ing processes the information about external world and creates its own re-representation on 
how it is to be in a conscious state of the processed information [53, 54]. In fact, both the HOT 
theory and connectionist model are consistent with the signal-detection framework (see [53]).
Following the HOT view on consciousness, our conceptual framework assumes that a com-
putational correlate of consciousness is relational property between first-order representation 
of emotion and metacognition [25]. Adopting such architecture of the machine consciousness 
Figure 1. General idea of robotic system with measurement function of objective conscious perception of human 
emotions (inspired by [35]).
Computational Models of Consciousness-Emotion Interactions in Social Robotics: Conceptual…
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72369
85
indicates that metarepresentation is distinct from first-order representation and may require 
separate neuronal structures in the brain. In fact, brain research provides empirical evidence for 
feasibility of such architecture of neurocomputations showing that metarepresentation may be 
associated with activation of prefrontal and parietal regions [36], while low-level representa-
tion may be responsible for fast emotion recognition which depends on the amygdala [17, 55]. 
There is also convincing evidence of independence between these two types of knowledge 
representations from behavioral measurements of dissociation between correctness of perfor-
mance in perceptual tasks and metacognitive awareness of such performance [33, 55] as well 
as neuronal instances of such dissociations in the brain [17, 56]. Common-sense intuition of 
brain activity also supports such view claiming that conscious knowledge about the stimulus 
does not relate to physical qualities of the perceived stimulus, but considers internal represen-
tations of the stimulus, which in turn refer to specific brain activation associated with stimulus 
perception [53]. It is worth mentioning that metacognition as higher level cognition, including 
monitoring, control processes, and evaluation, is sequential by nature [18]. Several computer 
modeling studies, for example, post-decision wagering procedures [57], demonstrate that 
metacognitive sequential strategies lead to consciousness of a stimulus. In the same vein, our 
brain study on metacognition with event-related potentials (ERPs) showed that metacognitive 
knowledge is crucial for conscious processing of emotion [58]. Similarly, a masking study with 
neural network simulations [54] shows that metacognitive knowledge can be underlined by a 
specific computational base for making conscious and unconscious decisions in terms of emo-
tion detection. Unquestionably, empirical studies on consciousness and metacognition linked 
to the problem of accuracy of metacognitive knowledge, and its neurobiological and computa-
tional basis suggests that HOT is a theory that can be empirically verified.
Here, it is important to indicate that Szczepanowski [33] has shown that the relation between 
consciousness and emotion predicted by HOT can be modeled numerically with a signal-
detection theory. In particular, SDT modeling has shown that under the emotion detection 
condition, subjective experience that expresses subjective feelings that accompany the first-
order representation of affective stimuli can be embraced in the model by including partici-
pant’s confidence responses [33, 55]. With regard to such SDT and HOT views, metacognition 
about task performance can be measured with a secondary sensitivity parameter d’Type II (see 
Figure 2). Evaluation of metacognition can include also cType II parameter which is a second-order bias that identifies metacognitive strategies leading either to under- or overconfidence 
in task performance evaluations [46]. In this way, the second-order SDT measurements of con-
sciousness provide objective information on subjective feelings of perceived affective stimuli.
In fact, Szczepanowski [33] has demonstrated that the SDT model of consciousness can embrace 
a hierarchical organization of affective processing, that is, objective information of performance 
in the emotion detection task must be reflected in a hierarchically higher level of processing. In 
this computational model of consciousness, there is an objective sensitivity measure of the per-
ceived affective information (e.g., parametric first-order sensitivity d’Type I > 0 or nonparametric 
A’Type I > 0.5) as well as an objective measure of metacognition (e.g., parametric second-order sensi-tivity d’Type II > 0 or nonparametric A’Type II > .5 indices). The validity of this hierarchical SDT model was empirically proved with visual masking experiments with emotional faces (e.g., [35, 57]). In 
fact, the modeling outcomes based on SDT show that human consciousness with accompanying 
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cognitive processes during detection of affective states may be a subject of empirical research. In 
addition, the interaction between consciousness and emotion can be related to decision-making 
processes which may be a result of computational-cognitive processes in the brain [33] and there-
fore potentially implemented into artificial environments of the social robot.
The above premises suggest that the hierarchical SDT model of consciousness can be used 
to determine computational correlates of robot’s consciousness and its subjective experience 
of emotion. According to such SDT view, subjective conscious feelings of the robot may be 
related to execution of second-order operations on internally generated information from pre-
vious processing linked with detection of incoming stimuli from environment registered by 
a sensory system of the robot. We therefore assume that such conceptualization of machine 
consciousness within the robot is necessary to effectively regulate robot’s behavior in terms 
of participation of metacognition in executing conscious control of cognition, in response to 
emerging affective information [18, 59].
8. Threshold approach to establish access consciousness for 
encoding C-E interaction by social robot
The third research domain for encoding C-E interactions by a social robot is to determine a 
computational correlate of global processing mode for consciousness of emotion. We assume 
that an adequate implementation of global information processing of emotion in the robotic 
system can be enabled by a threshold theory [33, 37]. As many experimental studies have dem-
onstrated, representation of affective information is preferred to be accessed to conscious pro-
cessing [60, 61]. For instance, in the area of consciousness research, backward masking studies 
provide substantial evidence that visual awareness occurs in the “all-or-none” fashion [62]. In 
the context of the masking task, this indicates that during stimulus detection, there is some sud-
den stepping-like burst of activation due to an incoming stimulus to enable transition between 
nonconscious and conscious states [63]. Some researchers suggest that such specific activation 
occurs in the brain as a threshold needed to activate access consciousness (see, for instance, 
Figure 2. Measurements of consciousness and metacognition with second-order sensitivity and bias parameters based 
on SDT (source: [46]).
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[63]). Indeed, Szczepanowski [33] has demonstrated that under a backward masking task, per-
ception of fearful face happens in the “all-or-none” fashion and may be a factor explaining why 
this emotion information is preferable to conscious access. In particular, it appeared that in the 
visual masking experiments, several participants presented characteristic patterns of metacog-
nition in terms of confidence in such a way that for the highest confidence, there are almost 
always hits without false alarms [37]. Because such observed response patterns followed ideal 
observer’s behavior (hit responses without highest false alarms), the masking data have been 
successfully modeled with a Krantz’s threshold detection theory [32, 33, 37]. This computa-
tional evidence that conscious perception of emotion is threshold-like processing implicates 
that under conditions in which stimulus strength is sufficiently large, the information content 
of the stimulus may be broadcasted in the system globally. This threshold-like information-pro-
cessing approach to consciousness suggests that decision-making underlying emotion percep-
tion follows a discrete mental states’ arrangement and its corresponding probabilities in terms 
of establishing conscious behavioral responses to affective information. Therefore, according to 
the outcomes from the threshold model, conscious processing in detecting emotion can activate 
global access to knowledge about emotion that manifests itself in ideal behavior of the observer.
The abovementioned outcomes suggest that global access to affective content in terms of meta-
cognition (meta-knowledge) involves thresholds [33]. In other words, access consciousness 
may be activated for the highest confidence ratings on the “all-or-none” basis. In this way, 
conscious access to representation of emotions and metacognition can be quantified with sig-
nal parameters predicted in the Krantz model [32]. In the three-state threshold model (see 
Figure 3. Linear ROC curve predicted by the Krantz’s threshold model (source: [37]).
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Figure 3), there are three mental states associated with perception, that is, the absence of ~D 
detection, D detection, and D* superdetection, and two thresholds, that is, upper and lower 
ones [32]. Detection of a target stimulus (probabilities P1 and P2) leads to mental states of D 
and D * (detection and superdetection), while detection of stimulus noise, described by the 
probability q, leads to a lack of detection ~D. The decision space described in the threshold 
detection theory is rectangular, and the ROC curve is linear as shown in [33]. It was demon-
strated that participant who can consciously access to the stimulus content produces ideal 
observer behavior that can be estimated the P2 parameter [33]. Hence, the threshold model can 
predict situations in which the highest confidence is generated when there is conscious access 
to emotion content. Indeed, computational evidence for the threshold-like processing is an 
important discovery, since, so far, another view on perception has dominated in experimen-
tal psychology claiming that perception is continuous and should be described primarily by 
the Gaussian distribution [31]. Thus, in our conceptual framework of machine consciousness, 
we assume that conscious detection of emotion by the social robot engages global processing 
mode in the “all-or-none” fashion, and we propose to model these C-E interactions with the 
use of an innovative computational approach based on the Krantz’s threshold theory [32].
9. Conclusions
As opposed to a typical application of industrial robots, a social robot needs to be considered 
as a social being with whom humans should be cooperating given a specific task structure. 
Therefore, the basic research aims of social robotics should be to determine computational 
models of the consciousness-emotion interaction designed to be implemented into a robotic 
platform. The request of preciseness in the context of computational models of emotions 
requires more research including related areas such as models of C-E interactions. This is a 
new research area in social robotics, and therefore it is potentially attractive from the perspec-
tive of development of computational models of emotion that are suitable for implementation 
in robots and contribute a new quality to the behavior of robots. It is believed that extend-
ing social robot competences and functionalities of HRI with C-E interactions will result in 
increasing acceptability of the social robot by the end user.
It seems that the abovementioned modeling outcomes of the C-E interaction based on the 
signal and threshold approaches are original contributions not only in the field of cognitive 
psychology but are crucial in the area of social robotics in terms of the possibility to imple-
ment high-level cognition into a social robot that effectively processes HRI in social domain 
[3, 4, 41, 64, 65]. In our conceptual framework, consciousness of emotion is the ability to detect 
affective information in the forced-choice condition, regardless choice decisions are low-level 
representation (features of the stimulus) or metarepresentation (subjective knowledge). In 
this way, consciousness may be attributed to an extremely simple function that can be asso-
ciated with detection of different types of signals in the mind [33] and simply implemented 
into a social robot’s design. In fact, adoption of the computational approach to consciousness 
that are based on quantitative detection parameters indicates that consciousness along with 
its subjective aspect is a specific function of the human brain and can be implemented into an 
artificial social robot’s construction.
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We believe that simplicity of such signal and threshold detection approaches that allow 
studying consciousness and its accompanying perceptual and metacognitive processes 
with the quantitative analysis will be optimal for implementing the C-E interactions into a 
social robot’s system. Our successful attempts to operationalize desirable C-E interactions 
in the social robot within the signal-detection and threshold frameworks may provide 
valuable guidelines for implementation formal characteristics of conscious behavior into a 
social robot’s construction and subsequently will be generalized for a much broader area of 
HRI. Finally, our understanding of cognitive mechanisms underlying consciousness and its 
subjective aspects will be the input to advance cognitive sciences, including philosophy of 
mind. In this way, our project will build a cross-disciplinary approach in designing effective 
HRI and machine consciousness that combine cognitive sciences and social robotics.
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